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1. Summary and introduction 
This paper informs the 
development community about the 
effects of climate change on 
migration patterns within and out of 
developing countries. It 
concentrates on the economic 
aspects of migration and on 
information that is relevant for the 
six semi-arid countries that are the 
focus of the PRISE (Pathways to 
Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies) 
project: Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Pakistan and 
Tajikistan. The insights are drawn 
from a broader review of the 
evidence by Waldinger (2015). 
The empirical evidence shows that 
people in developing countries are 
likely to respond to climatic change 
by migrating internally. There is less 
evidence on the relationship 
between climate change and 
international migration.  
The effect of climate change on 
migration depends crucially on 
socio-economic, political, and 
institutional conditions. These 
conditions affect both vulnerability 
to climate change and how 
important climate change is in 
determining migration decisions. 
People working in the agricultural 
sector are particularly affected by 
short-term climate shocks 
(droughts, flooding etc.) and long-
term climate change. There is 
evidence of this from Tanzania 
and many other countries (CCCS 
2014). Their vulnerability, however, 
depends on their ability to adapt to 
these changes, for example 
through the use of new crop 
varieties, as well as through non-
agricultural activities, such as 
consumption smoothing through 
access to credit, insurance and 
social safety nets.  
Migration has been a frequent 
response to climate variability and 
change in the past. There is strong 
evidence of this, for example in the 
Sahel region of West Africa 
(Scheffran et al., 2012a, 2012b).  
Migration might also be an effective 
response to the climate risks of the 
future, but only under certain pre-
conditions.  
Access to information on the 
economic and social costs of 
migration, on the advantage and 
disadvantages of potential 
destination locations, and the 
absence of credit constraints can 
help potential migrants make 
decisions that will improve their 
livelihoods.  The economy of 
Taj ik istan, for example, is 
benefitting from the remittances of 
migrant workers abroad (World 
Bank, 2014). 
Policy intervention is required to 
reduce potential negative impacts 
in both the sending and receiving 
region. Badly managed migration is 
associated with high economic, 
social and psychological costs.  
Nor will climate risks at the 
destination necessarily be lower, as 
the example of Senegal shows 
(Foresight, 2011). 
Planned, proactive migration may 
be a necessary and effective 
response to climate risks. 
Uncoordinated distress migration is 
a sign of adaptation failure.  To 
ensure effective migration choices 
and a good management of the 
wider socio-economic effects, 
policy-makers should: 
• Provide sufficient information 
about the costs and benefits of 
migrating, including 
psychological and social, along 
with more clarity about 
alternative adaptation options. 
• Release credit constraints, 
present in all PRISE countries 
and in particular in Senegal and 
Tajikistan, to offset the up-front 
costs incurred by potential 
migrants, particularly high in 
areas with poor transportation 
infrastructure. 
• Improve institutional quality to 
ensure the incentives to migrate 
are not reduced, in particular in 
the context of land tenure 
security when people are not 
able to sell their land or are not 
confident of reclaiming it upon 
return. 
• Define the legal status of 
environmental migrants, for 
example, through a process led 
by the UN or UNHCR, in order 
to give people certainty about 
their legal situation. 
• Put in place safeguards against 
distress migration, for example 
in the event of conflict, which 
can force people to choose 
sub-optimal migration 
strategies, leading to 
maladaptation. 
• Support the areas affected by 
outward migration by promoting 
links between migrants and 
their region of origin; “managed 
retreat” from severely affected 
regions may be a last resort if 
they become inhospitable. 
• Support the absorptive capacity 
of the receiving jurisdictions, in 
particular urban labour markets 
and public services, to manage 
the socio-economic 
implications of the arrival of 
migrants in a new destination. 
• Direct migrants away from 
environmentally vulnerable 
areas where they move to for 
different reasons, as is the case 
in Senegal where more than 40 
per cent of new migrant 
populations are located in high 
risk flood zones. 
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2. Important concepts 
2.1 Forms of 
migration 
Migrants choose destinations and 
duration based on existing 
networks, skill levels, credit 
constraints and travel costs. We 
can distinguish many forms of 
migration: 
• Depending on the destination: 
International and internal 
migration 
• Depending on duration: 
seasonal migration, medium-
term, and permanent migration 
• Depending on the reasons: 
Climate migrants, economic 
migrants, political migrants, 
social migrants 
• Depending on the underlying 
choice: forced migration and 
voluntary migration 
• Depending on development 
outcome: productive and 
unproductive migration 
Migration in all its forms is a 
prominent feature in the semi-arid 
lands of Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania (see Table 1). Internal and 
seasonal migration has always 
been and continues to be an 
important response to climate 
stress. Urbanisation trends are also 
prominent in all six countries. In 
Senegal, more than 40 per cent of 
the population now lives in urban 
areas.  
In terms of international migration, 
the number of emigrants 
significantly exceeds the number of 
immigrants. Particularly in Kenya, 
but also Pakistan, Senegal and 
Tanzania a large fraction of 
emigrants are highly educated, 
creating a problem of human 
capital flight or “brain” drain”. On 
the other hand, expatriate 
communities often generate 
substantial remittances, on which 
the domestic economy relies.
 
Table 1: Population, urbanisation and migration trends in PRISE countries 
  
Population 
growth (%) 
Urban population 
(%) 
Urban population 
growth (%) 
Emigrants w.  
tertiary 
education (%) 
Net migration 
(total) 
Burkina Faso 2.8 28.19 5.9 2.6 -125,000 
Kenya  2.7 24.78 4.4 38.5 -50,000 
Pakistan 1.7 37.86 2.8 12.7 -1,635,000 
Senegal 2.9 43.08 3.7 17.2 -100,000 
Tajikistan 2.5 26.62 2.7 0.6 -100,000 
Tanzania 3.0 30.20 5.4 12.1 -150,000 
SS Africa 2.7 36.65 4.1 12.6  
South Asia 1.3 32.19 2.6 5.4  
World 1.2 53.00 2.1 5.4  
  * Negative numbers denote net emigration ; positive numbers denote net immigration 
  Source: Castells-Quintana et al. (2015). Data are for 2013 or closest year. 
2.2 Environmental 
refugees 
Different terms are applied to those 
moving for environmental reasons, 
including environmental or climate 
refugee and environmental or 
climate migrant. Broadly speaking 
environmental refugees leave their 
place of residency because of 
sudden environmental change, 
whereas environmental migrants 
leave due to gradual, long-term 
climatic change (Keane, 2004).  
In international law, the status of 
people leaving their place of 
residency due to environmental 
reasons remains undefined. Legally 
speaking, the term ‘environmental 
refugee’ is a misnomer. One reason 
for the lack of definition is the 
difficulty of isolating environmental 
factors from other (often related) 
drivers of migration. 
In this policy note we are 
concerned with migration decisions 
by people confronted with gradual 
environmental change, and focus 
less on people forced to leave by 
sudden environmental shocks and 
natural disasters.
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3. The impact of climate change on migration 
3.1 Reasons to 
migrate 
Reasons for migration are very 
diverse. Typically, migration 
decisions cannot be traced back to 
only one category of causes. 
Instead, different causes interact 
and form the basis for migration 
decision. 
Important causes include economic, 
political and social factors. 
Environmental causes increase 
economic incentives for migration, 
especially if they directly affect 
incomes. 
3.2 Climate effects 
on migration I: via 
income 
One of the most important drivers 
of migration patterns across the 
world are differences in income 
levels. If a person expects that their 
income or living standards more 
generally would increase by moving 
to another place or country, then 
they have incentives to do so (e.g. 
Borjas, 2014).  
Hence, in cases where climate 
change affects current or future 
income or living standards, it may 
affect decisions to migrate.  
Climate change may increase 
incentives for migration by 
increasing income differentials.  
Climate events affect livelihoods 
through their effect on agricultural 
productivity (e.g. CCCS 2014 on 
Tanzania; also Burgess et al., 
2014; Guerrero Compean, 2013) 
and possibly through effects on 
non-agricultural income (e.g., 
Mueller et al., 2014 for Pakistan). 
Persistent drought in the Sahel has 
been identified as a key contributor 
to increased migration pressure 
(Scheffran et al., 2012a, b). In 
Burkina Faso, drier regions are 
more likely to engage in rural–rural 
migration, both temporary and 
permanent, than regions with more 
rainfall (Henry et al., 2004).  
Climate change may reduce 
incentives for migration by lowering 
income from agriculture and 
exacerbating credit constraints of 
potential migrants. As a result, the 
poorest and most vulnerable may 
be unable to migrate because they 
lack the necessary resources; they 
are trapped (Gray and Mueller, 
2012; Dustmann and Okatenko, 
2014; Robalino et al., 2014). In 
Burkina Faso, long-distance or 
international migration appears to 
be limited to years of high 
agricultural productivity (Henry et al., 
2004). 
3.3 Climate effects 
on migration II: via 
conflict 
The relationship between climate 
change and conflict remains highly 
controversial because the 
relationship is highly complex and 
heavily dependent on a country’s 
socio-economic, institutional, and 
political characteristics. 
Many developing countries are 
relatively dependent on agriculture 
and their political institutions often 
have limited ability to cope with 
economic or climate-related shocks. 
Financial markets, social safety nets 
or insurance systems are often 
weakly developed. This, combined 
with sometimes weak political, 
economic and institutional 
structures, limits capacity to 
manage and recover from shocks. 
There is evidence of specific 
historical cases where changes in 
climatic conditions increased 
pressure on resources and led to 
violence. It has been argued that 
historic persecution of Jewish 
communities in Europe often 
coincided with times of economic 
distress (Oster, 2004; Anderson et 
al., 2013) and that rural uprisings in 
China increased during periods of 
higher drought frequency (Jia, 
2014).  
There is some (although contested) 
evidence on the link between 
climate, economic shocks and 
conflict today (Miguel et al., 2004; 
Burke et al., 2014). For example, 
the conflict in Syria has coincided 
with a record drought in the Fertile 
Crescent, which was made two to 
three times more likely by climate 
change (Kelley et al., 2015). 
However, “climatic conditions are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for 
conflicts to occur” (Burke et al., 
2014).  
3.4 Empirical 
evidence on climate 
and migration 
Climate variability has well 
documented effects on internal 
migration (Marchiori et al., 2011; 
Barrios et al., 2006). For example, a 
decline in precipitation in Africa 
increased rural to urban migration 
within sub-Saharan African 
countries (Barrios et al., 2006; 
Henderson et al. 2014). Frequent 
incidences of climate disasters are 
also known to trigger distress 
migration (Qaisrani, 2014).
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In most sub-Saharan Africa 
economies rain-fed agriculture is 
very important. Changes in rainfall 
therefore have a critical effect on 
income from agriculture. Barrios et 
al. (2006) find that decline in rainfall 
can lead to increases in rural to 
urban migration (also Findley 1994). 
There is limited evidence about the 
effect of climate on international 
migration. Compared to the 
number of people in developing 
countries engaging in internal 
migration the number of people 
engaging in international migration 
is small (Piguet et al., 2011). 
Beine and Parsons (2014) examine 
the effect of long- and short-term 
temperature changes on migration 
empirically. They do not find 
evidence for an effect of climate on 
migration, but do find strong 
evidence for conflict to affect 
migration. 
3.5 Historical 
evidence on climate 
and migration 
Human populations have been 
exposed to substantial climatic 
change in the past. Archaeological 
evidence indicates that these have 
led to important shifts in human 
populations. 
• A 200-year drought in the Indus 
Valley led to the abandonment 
of the urban centres of the 
Harrapan Society, now in 
Pakistan (Marris, 2014). 
• During the African Humid 
Period (ca. 9000 to 6000 years 
ago) the Sahara was home to 
lakes and vegetation (Claussen 
et al., 2003). This enabled 
inhabitants of the Sahel region 
to enter and cross the area, 
and reach Europe and Asia. 
• Humid conditions and 
increased vegetation in the 
Central Sahara/Sahel region in 
the pre-historic period (e.g. 
195,000 and 120,000–110,000 
years ago) coincided with 
periods of human expansion 
into this region (Castaneda et 
al., 2009).  
Past episodes of climate change 
are not necessarily good guides to 
the future. Studies of climate 
change-induced migration forecast 
large streams of migrants (e.g. 
Myers 2002; Orach 2009, as 
quoted in Qaisrani 2014), but the 
underlying evidence is often weak. 
For a given shock, less migration 
may result compared to historical 
times because international borders 
and international laws limit 
migration. Increased migration 
could occur because of lower 
transportation costs and greater 
availability of information.  
“There is limited 
evidence about the 
effect of climate on 
international 
migration. Compared 
to the number of 
people in developing 
countries engaging in 
internal migration the 
number of people 
engaging in 
international 
migration is small.” 
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4. The economic effects of migration on 
developing countries 
4.1 Internal migration 
Through internal migration, 
households seek to diversify their 
portfolio of economic activities in 
order to ensure survival or to 
improve their standards of living 
(Ellis, 1998). Migration is used as a 
risk management strategy.  In 
Burkina Faso labour migration 
has been an off-farm livelihood 
strategy for drought-affected 
farmers since the 1970s (Nielsen 
and Reenberg, 2010). 
Empirical evidence shows the 
positive economic effects of internal 
migration on income. In Tanzania, 
migration added 36 percentage 
points to consumption growth 
between 1991 and 2004, 
according to one study (Beegle et 
al., 2011).  
However, positive effects depend 
on the receiving province’s 
characteristics. Benefits of internal 
migration only arise under certain 
conditions. Income inequality is 
reduced only through migration to 
provinces with growing industries 
and labor markets (Phan and 
Coxhead, 2010). Other conditions 
for beneficial migration include: 
• Access to community networks 
for finding jobs in urban areas 
• Access to transportation 
infrastructure  
• Information on potential returns 
to labour in distant markets  
• Land tenure security: the risk of 
expropriation deters rural-urban 
migration 
• Access to credit. 
4.2 International 
migration 
The economic effects of 
international migration on 
households in developing countries 
and developing countries’ 
economies can be both positive 
and negative.  
On the positive side, international 
migration often creates additional 
income from remittances. In 
Taj ik istan, for example, 
remittances now account for over 
50 per cent of GDP – the highest 
share anywhere in the world (World 
Bank, 2014).  International 
migration can also extend business 
networks, and there are benefits 
from returning migrants who have 
acquired capital and skills abroad.  
However, benefits only materialise if 
migrants remain in contact with 
their sending community, for 
example, through remittances. 
On the negative side, skilled 
migrant are net fiscal contributors 
and their departure therefore 
represents a loss for those left 
behind. Skilled labour attracts 
foreign direct investments and R&D 
activities and its absence may 
therefore reduce these beneficial 
flows (Docquier and Rapoport, 
2008). 
Skilled and unskilled labour are also 
complements in the production 
process. Loss of skilled labour may 
decrease productivity (and wages) 
of unskilled labour left behind and 
increase productivity (and wages) of 
skilled labour. As a result, inequality 
between skilled and unskilled 
labour may increase. 
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5. Policy recommendations 
Whether the economic 
consequences of migration are 
positive or negative and whether 
migration allows people to adapt 
efficiently to climate change depend 
on an array of socio-economic, 
political and institutional conditions.  
Migration can have positive 
economic effects if migrants go to 
productivity-enhancing areas. It can 
have negative economic effects if 
migrants go to areas where their 
labour force is not efficiently 
employed.   
Public policy can help to encourage 
positive migration choices and 
reduce risks associated with 
migration. The policy conditions 
needed to ensure effective 
migration choices are fairly generic, 
and apply to PRISE countries as 
well as more broadly. They include: 
• Clar ity about a lternat ive 
adaptat ion opt ions:  
Migration is not the only 
strategy to adapt to climate 
change. Migration becomes a 
viable choice when its costs 
and benefits compare 
favourably to those of other 
adaptation options.  To make 
that comparison the full costs 
and benefits of migration 
choices need to be understood, 
including psychological and 
social costs. For example, 
migration is a highly gender-
specific process, with most 
migrants being young men, 
which may disturb social 
processes such as family 
formation (on split family 
migration in Kenya see Agesa 
and Kim, 2001). 
• Suff ic ient information: 
Insufficient information on 
potential costs and benefits of 
migrating to certain destinations 
can lead to inefficient migration 
decisions. Migrants may incur 
the costs of migration but 
overestimate economic 
opportunities (Bryan et al., 
2011; Munshi, 2003). In 
addition, taking into 
consideration all types of costs, 
be they economic, social or 
psychological, is an integral part 
of making an informed choice 
about migration. Migrant 
networks play an important role 
in transmitting such information 
(De Brauw and Harigaya, 2007; 
Bryan et al., 2011; Munshi, 
2003). 
• No credit constra ints: 
Liquidity constraints lead to 
poverty-related labour 
immobility (Phan and Coxhead, 
2010). Credit constraints can 
force people to take the ‘wrong’ 
migration decision because 
migrants incur up-front costs 
(transportation costs, costs 
from not working, set up costs 
in destination location). These 
costs are especially high in 
areas with poor transportation 
infrastructure and in areas with 
limited access to credit. Credit 
constraints are present in all 
PRISE countries, but 
particularly prevalent in 
Senegal and Taj ik istan, 
where fewer than six per cent of 
the adult population have bank 
accounts with a formal 
institution (Castells-Quintana et 
al. 2015). 
• Suff ic ient inst i tut ional 
qual i ty: People may choose 
not to migrate even if they 
would benefit from migration if 
inadequate institutions reduce 
their incentives to do so. Land 
tenure security, for example, 
can affect incentives to migrate, 
if people are not able to sell 
their land or are not confident of 
reclaiming it upon return 
(Deininger and Jin, 2006; 
Mullan et al., 2011; for a 
differentiated view see De 
Brauw and Mueller, 2012). 
Improved land tenure security 
also increases people’s choice 
of alternative adaptation options. 
Alternatives may not be 
contemplated if an individual is 
unsure they will reap the 
benefits in the long term (Besley, 
1995). 
• Clar ity about legal status: 
Until now, the legal situation of 
people migrating due to 
environmental reasons remains 
undefined (Keane, 2004). 
Environmental migrants do not 
have a legal status comparable 
to a refugee’s legal status 
which would grant them legal 
protection to enter a country. 
The legal status of 
environmental migrants 
therefore needs to be defined, 
for example, through a process 
led by the UN or UNHCR, in 
order to give people certainty 
about their legal situation.  
• Safeguards against 
distress migrat ion: 
Unplanned migration in 
response to climate stress 
causes unnecessary hardship 
and economic loss. If “migrants 
are faced with death if they 
remain in their present place of 
residency,” (Hugo, 1996), they 
often have no choice but to 
leave, irrespective of the 
productivity potential of origin 
and destination location.  
Conflict may also force people 
to choose sub-optimal locations 
regardless of their economic 
opportunities. These are signs 
of policy failure and 
maladaptation.  
Policy-makers should also be 
aware of the wider socio-economic 
effects of private migration choices. 
Flanking measures may be needed 
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both in areas affected by outward 
migration and in the receiving 
jurisdictions. 
• Support ing areas affected 
by outward migrat ion: The 
effect of outward migration and 
‘brain drain’, which is a concern 
in most PRISE countries (see 
Table 1) can be lessened by 
promoting links between 
migrants and their region of 
origin, for example, if migrants 
send remittances back home or 
return to invest newly-acquired 
capital or skills. However, if 
climate change makes certain 
areas inhospitable, voluntary 
migration may eventually give 
way to ‘managed retreat’. Such 
resettlement is a delicate 
process and the economic, 
psychological and social costs 
of people being resettled are 
very high. 
• Support ing receiv ing 
jur isdict ions: Public policy 
can help manage the 
absorption process in receiving 
jurisdictions. The arrival of 
migrants poses important 
economic and social challenges. 
A receiving city’s labour market 
and infrastructure might not 
have the capacities to 
accommodate rapidly 
increasing numbers of people. If 
arriving migrants encounter 
problems entering the labour 
market or do not have access 
to public goods this will lead to 
economic and social problems. 
It is therefore crucial to 
strengthen the absorptive 
capacity of migration 
destinations, in particular urban 
labour markets and public 
services. 
• Direct ing migrants away 
from environmental harm: 
There may also be a need to 
direct migration movements to 
areas of decreased 
environmental risk. Many 
migrants move from 
environmentally vulnerable 
areas to areas that are equally 
vulnerable, albeit for different 
reasons. For example, in Dakar 
(Senegal) , more than 40 per 
cent of new migrant 
populations are located in high-
risk flood zones (Foresight, 
2011). It is important to identify 
such migration movements and 
take measures to either redirect 
them or reduce the risks 
present in receiving areas.
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